Freedom. The legacy of early modern scholasticism to contract law by Decock, Wim
  
Freedom 
The legacy of early modern scholasticism 




 (Katholiek Universiteit Leuven) 
 
By taking the audacious step of publishing James Gordley’s volume on the 
Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine in 1991, Oxford University 
Press must have thought itself to be taking a well-calculated risk. After all, owing to 
the bright new ideas it contains, Gordley’s book promised not only to become a 
best-seller for its own part, but, in addition, to usher in the very lucrative business of 
re-writing and re-editing many a traditional textbook on the history of private law in 
both civil and common law countries. Until that point in time, claiming that the 
cradle of modern contract doctrine was to be found in the massive treatises De 
iustitia et iure of moral theologians like Soto, Lessius, and Molina rather than in the 
natural law treatises of Grotius, Pufendorf and their likes had been a rather 
experimental, and marginal enterprise1. Fifteen years on, OUP seems to have been 
sufficiently delighted about the intrinsic qualities and success of the Philosophical 
Origins to further enhance the prospects of attaining its second objective by bringing 
a new book on to the market2. In 2006, James Gordley’s new publication, 
Foundations of Private Law. Property, tort, contract, unjust enrichment re-affirmed 
the key message of the Philosophical Origins, namely that it is rewarding and useful 
to change our minds about the history of contract law, not only for purely historical 
reasons, but also on the grounds that acknowledging the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
roots of the private law in the civil codes proves to be very useful in finding answers 
to present day dissatisfaction in applying the law of those codes. Orphanized, that is 
cut off from its original moral philosophical context, it is all but normal for the law 
of the codes to be suffering from chronic dysfunction.  
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In this presentation I will lead you to the heights of the late scholastic realm, a 
magic land to which I have set out inspired by the ideas of James Gordley, Robert 
Feenstra and Jan Hallebeek, amongst others. This journey would have remained a 
mental fiction, however, if the board of directors of the Marie Curie Program on the 
History of European Legal Cultures and my supervisors Laurent Waelkens and Italo 
Birocchi had not been willing to defy mainstream research in legal history by 
supporting a doctoral project focussing on original, unexplored Latin sources 
carrying a law which crosses national borders and which is profoundly intertwined 
with intellectual traditions that are not strictly legal in the modern sense3. Therefore, 
I would like to express my gratitude to all of them in the first place. Mobility, both 
in terms of crossing mental and physical spaces, is central to the Marie Curie 
program, so please allow me now to take you to the sky, where we will take a bird’s 
eye-view of the fields I have been exploring like a worm during the past two years. 
Leitmotiv or filo conduttore during our flight will be the idea of freedom. For, the 
central conclusion ensuing from my research, after having run around the 
hermeneutic circle to the point where it made my stomach spin, clearly is that 
Leonardus Lessius’ concept of the court of conscience, his contract doctrine, his 
economic thought as well as his pragmatic use of traditional authority can be 
explained on the basis of this one idea : freedom. As such, I do consider this 
principle to be the one that should form the thread holding together the different 
parts and chapters of my PhD, and, consequently, as the content matter that should 
determine its fundamental structure and form.  
 
Apart from an introductory and concluding chapter, my thesis centers around the 
four themes just mentioned (the court of conscience ; general contract doctrine ; 
economic thought [through Lessius’s discussion of particular contracts related to 
commerce] ; discourse analysis). In this presentation, I will touch on the two former 
themes, since the Groningen meeting of Belgian and Dutch legal historians gave you 
already a chance to catch a glimpse of Lessius’s economic skills. As to Lessius’ 
argumentation techniques, and his attitude towards authority, it would require of us 
far more close reading than is good for a swift and general introduction to his legal 
thought. Before we take off, a further preliminary remark is needed. You will notice 
no doubt that each of the main chapters of my PhD is apt to appeal in a bigger or 
lesser degree to a different readership : to historians of philosophy, law, economics, 
and philology respectively. Prominent scholars have already pointed out the pivotal 
role of Lessius in all of those fields. Stimulated by the mission statement of the 
doctorate in philosophy, history, sociology and anthropology of European legal 
cultures it is my explicit aim to put the rich diversity of these approaches together. 
Of course, the massive scope of this all-embracing perspective urges me to stick to 
Lessius and the early modern scholastic tradition he immediately draws from. This is 
a tradition whose immensity and richness still goes largely unnoticed, but which 
provides its explorers with thousands and thousands of unearthed folio-pages 
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anyway. This reality will become obvious to you while flying above the first main 
theme of my thesis. 
 
 
1. Conscience at the crossroads of law and morality : a 
basic grammar and vocabulary 
 
Historical scholarship at its best is an irritating sort of thing. It frustrates 
conventional truths and categories, all too often rooted in prejudices of a 
confessional or political nature. It is equally true, of course, that historians like you 
and me are biased ourselves in writing history. Yet there is clear evidence that the 
concept we now have of « conscience » does not match altogether the reality it 
incarnated in 16th and 17th century scholasticism. Many a notion we now associate 
with the functioning of a court would right away have pertained to the semantic field 
of « conscience » as it was understood at that time : a judgment on the basis of rigid 
and technical argument, enforceability, the settling of disputes and the regulation of 
life in society. In fact, « conscience » was expressly deemed to be a court, a 
« forum », ruled by the law of nature. It was considered a tribunal parallel to the 
« external forum », for its part based either on ecclesiastical law, commercial law, 
statutory law, or yet another kind of specific positive law. Only in a very weak sense 
would people have considered the court of conscience as a playground of personal 
sentiments or feelings, let alone as a kind of weak inner space cultivated by priests 
and poets and philosophers but scornfully looked upon by the strong inheritors of 
Kelsen’s positive law. Quite the reverse, in fact. A host of outstanding Italian 
historians have argued in recent years that the imperialistic and global promotion of 
the internal forum, the court of conscience, at the turn of the seventeenth century 
formed part of a strategy of the Catholic Church to create a universe of laws of 
conduct in all fields of life that would enable it to counter the growing body of 
positive state legislation issued by increasingly centralized non- or even anti-
Catholic governments4.  
 
If states could conquer territories, the Church could conquer souls irrespective of 
the countries they were dwelling in. In according these souls inalienable rights by 
birth, and in making these natural rights-endowed subjects obey the rules of natural 
law - the expert interpreters of which were the learned men, that is the clerics, of 
course - the Church would be able to attack positive legislation from within. Now 
the storm troops of the Church were to be the newly founded Jesuit order (°1540), 
and one of its most eminent soldiers in one of the most turbulent and avant-garde 
regions at that time was Leonardus Lessius (1554-1623)5. He is deemed to be one of 
the most fervent defenders of mental reservation, amphibologia, and of lying, being 
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tricky devices for escaping death under Protestant kings trying to convert Catholics 
in England and the Northern Netherlands, for example. His is the concept of 
subjective rights and of natural law later borrowed by Grotius, strictly separating 
natural law as the immutable dictate of reason from positive law as the changeable 
law laid down either by God or by man, and comprehending both divine law (Old 
and New Testament) and positive human law (ecclesiastical, statutory law, law of 
nations). At the same time, as top advisers of princes, merchants and the local beau-
monde, the Jesuits stressed the need for local rulers to model their positive laws on 
the natural law prescripts they were uncovering through reason, and for judges in the 
worldly courts to apply some of the measures imposed by natural law through their 
« officium iudicis ». 
 
Hence the emergence of nothing less than an immense yet so far largely ignored 
science of law in the wake of the Jesuits’ conquest of the human soul. In contrast to 
the late scholastic tradition of the School of Salamanca, dominated by coryphaei of 
the Dominican order such as Vitoria and Soto, the treatises on justice and law of the 
Jesuit moral theologians prove to be much more indebted to the ius commune and to 
legal thinking in a much more technical sense. The treatises De iustitia et iure of 
Molina, Lessius, and Lugo display a startling amount of references to Roman and 
canon law, as well as to its standard commentators, postglossators as well as 
decretalists. Next to that, you will find them citing local positive law, customs and 
business practices, in an attempt to solve the most delicate and concrete problems in 
all fields of life before the court of conscience. As such, their concept of conscience 
clearly does not smack of softness or vagueness. Their manuals, aimed at helping the 
« judges » in the court of conscience, contained a general law of torts and contracts, 
ensuing from their restructuring of the ius commune around general principles of 
Aristotelian-Thomistic moral philosophy, such as the virtue of commutative justice, 
for example. By the mid-17th century, this would lead the Jesuits to write even more 
vast treatises on all branches of private law. To be sure, historians do widely 
acknowledge the exceptional role of Jesuits like Ferdinand Verbiest and Athanasius 
Kircher in the development of China-studies, astronomy, calculus and medicine. Yet 
Pedro de Oñate’s (1568-1646) four-volume treatise De contractibus on general 
contract law, the law of lucrative contracts, and the law of synallagmatic contracts is 
hardly ever heard of, although it has been influential in both Europe and South 
America. Another attempt to create a real science of law, seeking to provide judges 
in both the internal and external fore with state-of-the-art legal wisdom, was made 
by Joseph Gibalin (1592-1671). Gibalin taught at the college of Lyon and published 
an impressive Scientia canonica et hieropolitica, as well as an incredibly vast 
treatise covering all of commercial and contract law De universa rerum humanarum 
negotiatione tractatio scientifica. 
 
Science. The Jesuits wanted to construct an all-encompassing science of law, 
borrowing from all existant legal traditions but ultimately transforming them around 
general principles derived from natural law. As such, they intended to build a 
normative universe parallel to the one increasingly provided by the state. The court 
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of conscience was to be its main place of enforcement. Now this is a moment where 
another prejudice might come in : doesn’t all this mean that a heavy extra burden 
was placed on Catholics across the Globe ? For the standards that need to be met 
before the court of conscience are much loftier and heavier than the standards set by 
public authority, aren’t they ? Well, I am afraid they are not necessarily so. They are 
more rational, consistent, and predictable, for one thing, since they are based on 
reason, not on the whims of governments. And they are more respectful of human 
freedom as a basic right of man, for another. One should not forget that at the heart 
of Jesuit moral theology and law of the early modern period, we find an 
exceptionally optimistic anthropological view as well as a model of problem solving 
highly indebted to a freedom-based view of human agency : « probabilism »6. 
 
How should I behave according to natural law in a particular case ? This is the 
basic question to be solved. In principle, a combination of sound reasoning on the 
basis of some natural principles included in human nature (e.g. someone’s need to 
survive, his sociability, etc.), as well as a sharp eye for concrete circumstances 
should enable a clever Jesuit like Lessius to discern the answer to the majority of 
ethical questions in a fairly easy way. However, such a naive and simple account of 
ethics would fail to take into account one basic feature of human reason : its fallible 
nature due to the fall of man from Paradise. As Soto noted, in its practical analysis 
of natural law, fallible right reason cannot derive absolute certainties nor 
indisputable moral precepts. Man can merely formulate frail opinions about the 
existence and the extent of a natural-law imperative. He can only persuade himself 
of the respective probability of these opinions, with probability depending either on 
sound argument, or on authority. As a consequence, the question of how we should 
behave, be it in concluding a testament or in observing Lent, is to be solved within a 
context of fundamental doubt and uncertainty. Now this is the point where a random 
sentence of the Digest, also figuring in the rules of law formulated by Pope Boniface 
VIII, comes in : melior est conditio possidentis (the position of the possessor is the 
stronger one) 7. It should not come as a surprise, that the Spanish had transformed 
this random sentence into a general principle of property law before tackling the 
question, put forward by emperor Charles V ‘after’ the conquest of the Americas, 
whether the Spanish could feel secure about their claimed ownership over the land 
previously belonging to the indigenous people. It is surprising, though, when in the 
second half of the seventeenth century we hear the Jesuit Antonio Perez (1599-1649) 
stating that the « melior est conditio possidentis-rule » of the ius commune has been 
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the one and unique cornerstone on which the whole building of Jesuit moral 
theology and law had been founded8.  
 
As a matter of fact, one comes across this basic principle quite frequently in 
Lessius. He denies, for instance, that the beneficiary of a testate succession that fails 
to meet the formal requirements would need to render the testator’s property to the 
inheritor ab intestato. To support his claim, he expressly makes reference to the 
« melior est conditio possidentis-rule »9. Yet on a more general level, this rule 
proves to be even more fundamental. With regard to the question whether in a case 
of doubt an obligation stemming from natural law exists at all, absent any particular 
conflict between men, Antonio Perez sums up the view which Suarez, Bonacina, 
Sanchez and many other Jesuits have taken as follows : « dubitans est possessor 
suae libertatis » (even in doubt, you are still the possessor of your liberty). Take 
« melior est conditio possidentis » as a maior, with « dubitans est possessor suae 
libertatis » as a minor of the most simple syllogism, and what you get is that human 
freedom always prevails against any doubts about the existence of a possibly 
burdensome natural law obligation. Freedom is the basic condition of man. Its 
position resembles that of a plaintiff in a lawsuit, and thus, according to Perez, the 
onus is on the natural law which claims to limit the original freedom of men. If you 
wonder whether Lent has begun, then, because you do not possess any clear 
indication as to date nor time, you are still free to eat meat. Such was the startling 
conclusion, or rather the point of departure of Jesuit legal and moral thought. A 
point of departure radically different from traditional moral and canonical thought 
up to late scholastics such as Soto. They took what is known to be a ‘tutioristic’ 
stand, which means that they would choose the safer opinion (opinio tutior). The 
safer opinion being to suppose that there is a law in case you doubt about the 
existence of this very law. Lessius and many other Jesuits did disagree with this 
traditional line of thought. Significantly, the Jesuit Antonio Perez expressly points 
out the rationale behind the Jesuits backing the probabilistic stand instead : « quia 
favent libertati operandi, et ab innumeris obligationibus homines liberant » (they 
favour freedom of action and free mankind from innumerous obligations)10. 
 
It would be inappropriate for us to dwell on the anthropological, theological and 
even strategic reasons behind the early modern Jesuits’ optimistic defence of 
freedom. Let me just point out that a « We are free »-slogan turns out to be hugely 
compatible with a yet more famous one : « Yes we can »… To sum up, then, we 
should answer in the negative our original question of whether the erection of a 
normative universe parallel to the one of the state and backed up by a court of 
conscience necessarily places an excessive burden on Catholics dispersed over state 
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territories. Granted, Lessius’s De iustitia et iure features an idea of positive law as a 
reduced quantity of the total of obligations ensuing from natural law. Not all natural 
law obligations can be turned into civil law obligations for pragmatic reasons : the 
judicial system would simply be unable to cope with the higher number of lawsuits 
due to the higher number of possible violations of civil law obligations. But we 
should not always think of positive law in modern terms either. The present Belgian 
penal code, for example, includes a paragraph making it an obligation to help a co-
citizen in great need, as when he is drowning. If you do not, you are not just a 
dishonourable person, but you will be punished in court11. Discussing the same 
question, however, Antonio Perez, drawing on Lessius, plainly states that there 
cannot be any obligation whatsoever as a matter of justice to run to the rescue of a 
fellow human being. There could well be an obligation as a matter of charity, of 
course, but no obligation enforceable before the court of conscience exists. For you 
have the entire dominion over your liberty (« quilibet est perfecte dominus suae 
libertatis »)12. In this manner, no one can claim something from you as a matter of 
justice, unless you have transferred to him a right over a very specific and limited 
part of your freedom by means of a contract or quasi-contract (e.g. deriving from 
your « officium », namely the deontological obligations following from your 
belonging to a certain class of people). 
 
 
2. General contract doctrine 
 
The gateway leading us to the second main part of my PhD territory, is flanked by 
two columns : one at its left hand side, featuring a statue of justice, and another one 
at its right hand side, with a statue of liberty on top of it. An obvious welcome, 
indeed, given that the two main principles ruling Lessius’s contract doctrine are the 
principle of commutative justice and the principle of free and mutual consent. 
Though we are used to the latter concept, the former might strike us as an 
unwelcome substrate of times when contractual freedom was still being choked by 
the incense of a religion and philosophy eager to break the projects of individuals. 
To be sure, a relict of it is still to be found in the random application of the idea of 
gross disparity and unconscionability, but as a general principle inequality definitely 
was removed from our codes for the sake of contractual freedom - thus runs a 
common proposition. Nevertheless, we will see that the tribute paid by the early 
modern scholastics to the Aristotelian-Thomistic virtue of commutative justice was 
exactly the catalyst to set free a host of contracts and accessory pacts hitherto 
deemed unenforceable or illicit by Roman-canon law. Once again, some Socratic 
midwifery will prove very helpful in overcoming traditional prejudices about 
« scholasticism ». Rather than suffocating the law, scholasticism as a systematic 
method of doing research in academia provided the early modern scholastics with 
the tools to adapt traditional structures to new real life circumstances.  
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A key principle of the scholastic method consists in defining your terms before 
starting an argumentation, as well as demonstrating that you are thoroughly 
acquainted with past scholarship before you start and pretend to know everything 
much better. Now that is exactly the way in which Lessius sets out to discuss general 
contract theory, before launching his own natural law based doctrine rooted in 
promise. In sketching the established ius commune teachings on contract, however, 
Lessius already points out some of the cracks in the old building compared with his 
own natural law doctrine. Though quoting the time-honoured Labean definition of 
contract as synallagma or mutual obligation, Lessius slightly modifies the formula in 
calling contract merely an external sign of practical significance producing an 
obligation for both parties to the contract on account of their mutual consent 
(contractus est signum externum practicum, ultrocitroque obligationem ex consensu 
contrahentium pariens)13. Next, he opens up the definition to the effect that it also 
includes unilateral contracts, like donation, only to finish by saying that, personally, 
he takes « contract » to be synonymous with « pact ». As such, any mutually 
accepted expression and coincidence of wills (duorum consensus atque conventio) is 
to be considered enforceable. At which point Lessius stresses the need for the 
externally expressed wills to be mutually accepted. Otherwise we are not dealing 
with a pact, but rather with an unbinding promise. It is precisely his stressing the 
need for acceptance along with the offer to get a binding contract, which makes 
Lessius a unique harbinger of a fundamental principle of present day contract 
doctrine14. 
 
Yet despite the glimpses of innovation surprising us right from the outset, the 
traditional Roman categories of enforceable contracts, and the Medieval doctrine of 
the vestimenta pactorum are reviewed first. Interestingly, every now and then 
Lessius compares the ius commune with natural law doctrine. In marked contrast to 
the Roman law teachings on error, for example, Lessius makes a huge effort to 
demonstrate that from a natural law point of view, the distinction between 
contractus bonae fidei and the contractus stricti iuris concerning mistake does not 
hold water. In both cases, he argues, mistake which gave rise to the contract results 
not in absolute but rather in relative nullity in favour of the mistaken party. By 
making reference to Jean Feu and Pierre de Belleperche, and by reinterpreting 
Digest 4, 3, 7 and Codex 8, 38, 5, Lessius seeks to demonstrate that even Roman law 
would not consider a contractus bonae fidei to be utterly void but rather voidable at 
the option of the mistaken party15. The final motivating factor behind his advocacy 
for an equal treatment of the formerly distinguished types of contract is that the 
common good (bonum commune) demands it. For along these new lines a contract is 
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still binding, in case the mistaken party disclaims his right to nullify the contract, for 
instance because he actually benefits from it. In this way, the legal system could 
frustrate the attempts made by unscrupulous gamblers who first by fraudulent means 
entice the other party into a contract only to defend themselves against the action of 
the winner upon losing the game by claiming that the contract was void. This 
constituted a massive problem in his time, as Lessius explains further on in a chapter 
on gambling and contracts of chance.  
 
Still another, obvious discrepancy between Roman law, canon law, statutory law 
and natural law regards the question whether a « nude pact » is binding. Lessius 
cannot help but note that by the time he is writing his treatise, namely at the end of 
the 16th century, this actually is an outdated question. For in any court in the 
Netherlands and Spain, the principle that all pacts are binding (« pacta 
quantumcumque nuda sunt servanda ») has long been introduced through custom 
and common judicial practice. Nevertheless he contents himself by pointing out the 
usual rationale behind the non-enforceability of any pact in traditional Roman law : 
ne lites multiplicarentur (lest the judicial system is overloaded). And he maintains 
that on the basis of praetorian actions, Roman law had already attained a general 
enforceability of all pacts too. As for the classical canon law, he points out the 
requirement of « causa », the absence of which gives rise to a presumption of error 
or fraud. Before the court of conscience, however, any intent of a promisor to 
obligate himself as a matter of justice which is outwardly communicated to and 
accepted by the promisee entails enforceability.  
 
Does that mean Lessius conceived of contractual liberty in the widest of senses - a 
term (libertas contractuum16) he explicitly uses himself, by the way? Generally 
speaking, I would say so, granted that the usual and present day qualifications about 
the (relative) nullity of contracts going against positive law were also recognized by 
Lessius, of course. Yet we should not commit the mistake of overstating this 
qualification about the material side of contractual liberty. A lease remains valid, 
according to Lessius, even though the incoming tenant can readily be estimated to be 
renting a house for immoral purposes, that is, even though the causa finalis of the 
contract on the part of the tenant is to accomodate prostitutes or usurers. Even canon 
law regulations concerning this matter have been abolished by custom, he admits17. 
In addition, Lessius repeats time and again that even if a certain act which 
constitutes the object of the contract is totally unlawful, still the accompanying 
contract may be valid post patrationem. At least from the moment the act has been 
fulfilled, a contract ob turpem causam (materialem) is valid. In this manner, Lessius 
expressly aims at preventing prostitutes or contract killers from rendering their 
services without being paid afterwards. In no way are these types of contract to be 
considered gratuitous. Consequently, as in any other onerous contract, a prostitute or 
murderer should get the right equivalent to his or her performance. For, we should 
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not only consider the intrinsic evil of the act performed, according to Lessius, but 
also the labour, risks and damages that were suffered, as well as the fidelity, lust and 
usefulness that were offered to the other contracting party. All of these services have 
a price, which, as a matter of commutative justice, should be paid to the 
perpetrator18. 
 
So much for the material side of contractual liberty, which in principle is free and 
open, as one must conclude. But what about formal aspects governing the law of 
contracts ? Did Lessius really conceive of consensualism as the general basis of 
contractual obligation before the court of conscience? Again, I would submit that he 
did so. A good test-case proves to be the question we already touched upon in 
discussing the all-pervasiveness of the « melior est conditio possidentis-rule »: Is it 
lawful for a beneficiary of a testate succession that fails to meet the formal 
requirements to retain the testator’s property instead of rendering it to the inheritor 
ab intestato ? In fact, it was commonly acknowledged in Lessius’s time that the 
absence of the normally required solemnities would not affect the natural obligations 
ensuing from a testament ad piam causam. Even before the external, ecclesiastical 
court, formalities had already been reduced to a minimum by Pope Alexander III -
 an intervention Lessius defends on account of the indirect secular power of the 
Church. The crux of the debate, however, was the question whether testaments ad 
causam non piam could also produce a natural law obligation. Put differently, 
whether a general principle of non-formality existed before the court of conscience ? 
Diego de Covarruvias y Leyva took the view that a purely consensual testament 
could only obligate as a matter of natural law in an improper sense, that is, as a 
matter of honesty (ex honestate). As a consequence, the testate possessor could not 
defend himself, not even before the court of conscience, since he had not been 
conferred a right on the inheritance. Re-interpreting canon law by means of the 
equity-principle, though, Lessius radically opposed Covarruvias’s view. According 
to him, a purely consensual testament does obligate as a matter of natural law in its 
proper sense (ex iustitia), meaning that it does confer a right on the testate possessor. 
Therefore, the latter could claim to retain the inheritance before the court of 
conscience, though in theory he could not in a secular court. To explain the 
distinction between the different courts, Lessius expressly draws a parallel with 
naked pacts here. They, too, confer a right. They are not merely binding on the 
grounds of honesty19. 
 
Now this takes us to a question of the utmost importance. How is a contract 
formed, and what constitutes the source of its obligating force before the court of 
conscience ? People tend to say that, of course, pacts were always binding before the 
court of conscience in the « Middle Ages ». God would want them to be. A promisor 
had a « moral duty » to keep a promise. That is how a contract came to be honoured. 
Yet I cannot support those duty- or God-oriented explanations, when confronting 
                                                 
18
 LESSIUS, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 18, dubit. 3, num. 19, p. 218. 
19
 LESSIUS, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 19, dubit. 3, num ; 26, p. 239. 
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them with what the original Latin texts are telling us. To be sure, man can bind 
himself towards God (ex religione) by swearing an oath (iuramentum), but Lessius 
clearly thinks of contracts as a distinctly human affair, definitely when it comes to 
finding a reason why a contracting party should honour a contract. What we are 
witnessing here might be an important moment in the history of secularization, one 
could be tempted to say. For one thing, contrary to Soto, Molina, Ledesma, and 
many other a late scholastic, Lessius did not believe that an uncommunicated 
unilateral promise could entail a natural obligation. Locked up in our brains, a 
promise regarding a gratuitous or onerous act towards another human being cannot 
possibly bring forward any obligation on either side. Lessius thinks only an exterior 
act, namely speech or another external sign, is able to effectuate the interior intent 
which it signifies20. Or to put in the terms of Ferdinand De Saussure, signifier and 
signified are mutually dependent on each other with regard to their existence. 
Remember Lessius’s modified version of the Labean definition of contract ?  
 
However, it does not suffice for a promisor to exteriorize his intent to the 
promisee. A second condition in the formation of a binding contract is its acceptance 
by the promisee. This might strike you and me as an obvious requirement, but 
Lessius had a hard job refuting the counterarguments brought forward by luminaries 
such as Covarruvias and Molina. According to a long-dated tradition, Roman law 
had recognized the enforceability of unilateral promises (pollicitationes) in a few 
cases, one of which is the unilateral promise to pay money to the municipality 
(pollicitatio civitati). Applying the common maxim that a civil obligation cannot 
exist unless at the same time there is a natural obligation lying behind it, Molina had 
inferred from the above said that as a general rule natural law recognizes the 
enforceability of a unilateral promise, absent consent of the promisee. Unable to 
attack the common maxim underpinning Molina’s logic, Lessius had to deny that 
Roman law was actually saying what it was held to say according to tradition. He 
interpreted the passages in Dig. 50, 12 to mean that civil law only prohibited the 
promisor from revoking his promise21. Even a civil law obligation could only come 
into existence, though, from the moment the municipality did accept the promise. 
Roman law had not attributed an obligating force to the unilateral promise, then. 
Therefore, Lessius could claim that there was no natural obligation either. Having 
countered this solid argument based on Roman law, Lessius could simply quote his 
definition of pactum as conventio, or the meeting (con-venire) of two distinct wills, 
to demonstrate that consent of both parties to the contract was required.   
 
The ultimate reason behind Lessius’s innovative view of contract formation, is 
that he takes a very « balanced » or « equilibrated » view of contract. Basically, he 
considers a contract as the conferring of a right (ius) on the promisee to which 
corresponds a debt (debitum) on the side of the promisor22. In other words, contract 
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 LESSIUS, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 18, dubit. 5, num. 30, p. 219. 
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 LESSIUS, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 18, dubit. 6, num. 40, p. 220. 
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 LESSIUS, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 18, dubit. 8, num. 52, p. 224. 




is a matter of commutative justice. As such, its enforceability too is a matter of 
commutative justice. Again, this is not an obvious conclusion. Tommaso de Vio 
Cajetanus, for example, had argued that a contract is binding only as a matter of 
honesty and truth. This is a far more unilateral view of contract, making the 
enforceability of a contract depend on the duty of the promisor to observe his 
promises. In Lessius’s view, however, the promisee has been conferred a right, 
which enables him to take hold of a piece of liberty of the promisor. He is not 
dependent on the good faith and willingness of the promisor to enforce the contract. 
Molina, on the other hand, had stressed the intention of the promisor : the binding 
force of a promise depends entirely on the extent to which the promisor wanted 
himself to be bound. If a promisor only wants to be bound as a matter of truth and 
honesty, the promisee will not have a legal claim to performance. He will have such 
a claim, however, if the promisor intends to bind himself as a matter of justice. 
Lessius too recognizes that the extent of contractual obligation somehow depends on 
the intention of the promisor. For example, by promising he may only intend to 
show his sympathy towards the other party. Yet as a general principle in important 
matters (materiae notabiles) Lessius thinks every contract should be binding as a 
matter of strict justice (omnis obligatio contractuum est obligatio iustitiae)23. The 
idea of commutative justice cannot necessarily be considered, then, as a restraint on 
the development of modern contract doctrine. It even brought the late scholastics to 
reflect on what is now considered to be the reliance principle in contracts. Even 
though they thought that the extent of contractual obligation should be determined 
by the will or intent of the promisor, they recognized that a promise should give rise 
to a claim for damages if the promisee had relied on the form and wording in which 
the intent had been declared. 
 
The Aristotelian-Thomistic principle of equilibrium and equality in exchange 
dropped a big bomb, then, in the traditional realm of the ius commune. It supported 
the development of a host of economic ideas, too, and the breakthrough of a 
business morality compatible with the flourishing of commercial capitalism24. And it 
won’t come as a surprise to you, I guess, that at the outskirts of my PhD land you 
will see Lessius devising a host of argumentation techniques to defend himself 
against traditional legal and theological authority. However, before bombs rain on us 
from the sky, I would suggest that you come down and prepare for a safe landing. 
As a concluding testimony to the incredible defence of contractual liberty Lessius 
and other early modern Jesuits stood for, let me just finish by quoting Pedro de 
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  LESSIUS, De iustitia et iure, lib. 2, cap. 18, dubit. 8, num. 55, p. 224. 
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  I have developed this argument in “L’usure face au marché: Lessius (1554-1623) et 
l’escompte des lettres obligataires”, in Anne GIROLLET (ed.), Le droit, les affaires et 
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Oñate. In one of the opening chapters of his volume on general contract doctrine, he 
has it that25:  
 
A vast number of irritating and useless disputes and lawsuits have been removed 
thanks to the conformity of natural law, canon law and Spanish law with regard to 
the enforceability of naked pacts. In the most sensible way, liberty has been restored 
to the contracting parties, so that whenever they want to enter into whatsoever a 
contract in whatever way, their freely made agreement will be enforced before any 
court they want. 
 
 
                                                 
25
 Pedro de OÑATE, De contractibus, Romae, 1646, tom. 1, disp. 2, sect. 5, num. 166, p. 40. 
